[Preface] [Overview] [History] [Buyout or Bailout?] [Garden City & Beyond] [Conclusion] [References] [Appendix]

1984 Flood

The flood of Memorial Day '84 made Tulsa's previous record flood of Memorial Day '76 look like a practice drill. This time, up to 15 inches of rain fell in no more than six hours, again centered on the Mingo Creek basin but extending throughout much of the city. The results were devastating.

The 1984 flood killed 14, injured 288, and left $180 million in damages citywide. Mingo Creek alone accounted for $125 million of the damages.

In the chaotic hours during the flood, a small team of city managers gathered in the basement Emergency Operations Center. Information was sparse and conflicting; they could hardly believe the fragmented reports they were receiving. The team was headed by Mayor Terry Young and Street Commissioner J.D. Metcalfe. Both had come into office only 19 days before, but both had been involved with Tulsa's drainage issues for years. In the darkest hours of the flood, the team vowed to try a different kind of flood recovery this time.

Thus was born Tulsa's largest floodplain clearance and mitigation program. By daylight, Young and Metcalfe were convening experts to develop a recovery and mitigation program. They hired three consultants to develop the plan. In the lead was Charles Hardt, the former city chief hydrologist, by 1984 a consultant with McLaughlin Water Engineers, working on flood control in Tulsa and around the nation. The other two consultants were Stan Williams, the former city planner, now an attorney who had recently completed a stint with FEMA where he led the staff group that developed a landmark process for dispatching federal interagency hazard-mitigation teams following disasters; and Ron Flanagan, a Tulsa planning consultant who had been working on Tulsa flood issues since the early 1970s.

The city set up its own in-house Tulsa Flood-Hazard Mitigation Team, and the McLaughlin team set to work before their contract was drafted. They spearheaded a survey of flooded areas, with the Corps of Engineers, city engineers, and a flock of volunteers from the private engineering community.

Within 72 hours after the flood, they had prepared maps showing the extent of flooding, including identification of the most critical areas. In less than two weeks after the flood, they had identified target buy-out areas, and Tulsa's 1984 flood-hazard mitigation program was well under way.

1984 program

They proceeded with a great sense of urgency.

The leadership team knew that a federal interagency hazard-mitigation team would be coming to Tulsa shortly, to issue mitigation recommendations within 15 days after the May 31 disaster declaration. Tulsa leaders determined to meet them coming in with local recommendations, couched so persuasively that the feds would agree.

The Tulsa team wanted to help victims stabilize their lives as quickly as possible, while still seizing the opportunities for change that would exist only briefly after the flood.

In Tulsa, frequently flooded victims had considerable experience with rebuilding; victims and the government historically made the most critical decisions within the first three days after a flood. The victims, as a group, seemed to move rapidly through several trauma stages: shock, euphoria at still being alive, determination to rebuild their lives, and tremendous grief and anger. According to Tulsa's past pattern, within three days the City Commission would convene in emergency session, waive building permits and fees for victims, and set about trying to help them rebuild.

After the 1984 flood, the city team deliberately tried to slow that process down, until it could determine whether it might be possible to clear some of the flooded houses before they were rebuilt, leveraging local funds with flood insurance and other post-disaster funds.

The staff knew that "substantially damaged" buildings could not be rebuilt unless they complied with federal flood regulations --- and the city intended to comply with that requirement.

By two weeks after the flood it appeared some acquisition projects might be possible. Citizen acceptance was mixed, making political leadership especially tricky. By hinting at floodplain acquisition possibilities, the city raised tremendous hopes among flood victims who didn't want to rebuild. At the same time, this possibility triggered equally tremendous anger among flood victims who wanted to rebuild and get on with their lives.

Two of the five City Commission members opposed any acquisition program, contending that costs exceeded benefits. Commissioners Walter Hall and Roy Gardner argued that the proposed buy-out was really a "bail-out" for people who should have known they were living in a flood zone.

One of the opponents publicly scored Mayor Young and Commissioner Metcalfe for raising "false hopes" for flood victims.

"A false hope is better than none," countered flood victim Abbot Grant, whose home was flooded to the ceiling. It was his sixth flood since 1970.

Eventually, after bitter debate, an acquisition project was approved.

1984 highlights

Here are some highlights of Tulsa's 1984 flood buy-out.

• Program scope. The Tulsa team's initial recommendation was for purchase of 535 flooded homes in 20 areas. After debate, the program was scaled back to about 300 homes in nine sites. Two years later, the city also bought the flooded Holiday Mobile Home Park with 228 floodprone pads, before it was rebuilt.
  
  
• Acquisition process. Mayor Young and Commissioner Metcalfe strongly believed that the city should handle the acquisitions swiftly, with maximum possible care and consideration for flood victims. Young's administrative assistant, Twyla Mason Gray, led the team that managed individual negotiations and acquisitions. The city and each seller obtained appraisals, based on fair market value the day before the flood. The city intended that all purchases be voluntary. At one point, some 15 owners threatened to sue the city, but as the process proceeded they withdrew their objections. Ultimately, the buy-out was completed without condemnations.
  
  
• Rebuilding moratoria. On June 1 ... Day 5 after the May 27 flood ... the city established a moratorium on mobile home hookups for 30 days, until the city could conduct case-by-case reviews. It was to be the first of a series of moratoria. The most important was imposed on Day 15 (June 11), when the city designated high-hazard areas and denied permits for all repairs until the city could complete its mitigation plan. An appeal process was added on Day 18, allowing some flexibility for case-by-case reviews. After initial confusion about standards, the city adopted a policy that building permits would be required for any structure with more than 18 inches of flooding or repair costs exceeding $5,000. This standard was recommended by FEMA and SBA, which established a policy that SBA loans could be used toward relocation if a structure was in an area where the city prohibited repair.
  
  
• Hotline, media, and outreach. Demands for information were overwhelming. Fortunately, Tulsa's news media were sophisticated, having been through many floods, so news coverage remained focused on recovery long after the flood. Of course, the coverage was not all positive, and the media could not cover all the individual issues that victims faced. To improve information flow, the city set up a hotline, staffed in part by mental health volunteers. By Day 26 (June 22), the city also set up a mobile office. Later, periodic mailings and newsletters were sent to interested citizens in the final acquisition areas. One television station carried live coverage of Mayor Young's speech on Day 46 (July 11), when he announced the details of the acquisition and mitigation program.
  
  
• Holiday Mobile Home Park. The most dangerous site during the flood was probably Holiday Mobile Home Park, which had 228 floodprone units swamped by swift, high waters. On the city's recommendation, the Federal Interagency Hazard Mitigation Team urged Tulsa to refuse to reconnect utilities to any of the severely damaged homes. Specifically, the city required certification by a registered professional engineer that each home could be successfully tied down, even during a raging flood. Park owners sued the city. Eventually, two years after the flood, the city agreed to settle by purchasing the park for $2 million. Because the expenditure was for a settlement judgment, the city was able to tap the sinking fund for the money. The cleared park has been retained as floodplain open space.
  
  
• Structural versus nonstructural issues. Opponents also argued that acquisition was not fiscally sound and that the funds would be better used to build structural projects. Proponents countered by arguing that nonstructural projects are still projects, as necessary for the storage or conveyance of flood water as any concrete structures. The acquisition program was "engineeringly sound and morally right," argued Street Commissioner Metcalfe, just before the successful (though split) City Commission vote to approve the mitigation program.
  
  
• Hardship Committee. Popular belief was that flood victims would oppose relocation, and some initially did, for varying reasons, but ultimately, Tulsa's 1984 buy-out was conducted on a voluntary basis, with no need for condemnation. A far greater political problem was limiting the buy-out to 306 single-family homes, when the flood had damaged nearly 7,000 buildings. Survivors were traumatized and frightened. Many of the requests for buy-outs were emotionally wrenching, from people in dire circumstances. To deal with the problem, the city established a hardship committee to hear appeals. Ultimately, the committee made minor adjustments, adding and deleting a few properties in the acquisition plan, but the committee provided a needed relief valve during a time of community crisis.
  
  
• Priority criteria. Tulsa was incredibly lucky to be able to tap consultants, local team members, and political leaders who had broad and deep knowledge of the city, its flood issues and floodplains, and federal issues. Many decisions could therefore be based on seasoned judgment, rather than detailed written criteria. The team's difficult decisions on whether to include or exclude properties from buy-out areas were guided, in general, by evaluating danger, flood depth and velocity, damage, and existing project plans. Because funds were limited, only single-family homes ... and later, mobile home sites ... were acquired.
  
  
• Spin-off benefits. Tulsa accrued many benefits from the 1984 post-flood acquisition program. Given their histories, the cleared homes would undoubtedly have flooded again. In some cases, owners moved their own homes to dry sites; the city purchased the properties and sold them, at scrap value, back to owners. In some cases, the Tulsa redevelopment agency moved flooded but sound homes to land previously cleared in a former slum ... where the moved houses served to create a market that subsequently stabilized the neighborhood. In several instances, cleared floodplains were used for flood control works. In other cases, the cleared lands are used for open space and recreation, including hiking and biking trails.
  
  
• Funding for single-family acquisitions. Tables 1 and 2 list costs and fund sources for Tulsa's major acquisition programs, including the 1984 acquisition. Financing had to be delicately balanced.

By chance, Tulsa had capital sales tax funds that were unallocated at the time of the flood. Opponents were successful in preventing direct expenditure of sales tax funds. The city instead sold revenue bonds, pledged the unallocated sales tax toward repayment, and used the interest to finance the city's share of the flood buy-out. This maneuver was necessary to avoid charges that the city had used the sales tax for a purpose not approved by voters.

Politically, the buy-out was a stronger proposition if leaders could argue that they were leveraging federal funds. They got an early ruling that flood insurance checks (for structure damage, not contents) and SBA loans could be used toward the acquisition. After negotiations between FEMA's disaster coordinator, Robert Broussard, and Mayor Young, FEMA agreed to accept an application for 1362 funds. The process was complex, and the timing was critical. FEMA assigned staff to work with the city to iron out all the issues.

FEMA divided the cost of acquisition on a 50-50 basis after deduction of flood insurance claims. Table 1 shows cost sharing for the 1362 project area.

In addition to the use of Section 1362 funds and flood insurance claims, the 1984-85 phase of the Tulsa program took advantage of the availability of federal temporary housing assistance and Small Business Administration involuntary relocation loans.

By using these post-disaster assistance sources, the 1984 program's net cost to the city was only 65 percent of the total cost, significantly lower than net costs in 1974 and 1979 acquisition programs, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2

TULSA FLOOD ACQUISITION COST, 1974-84

Post-flood Acquisition Priority Criteria

With 7,000 buildings flooded in 1984 and limited funds, Tulsa leaders faced difficult decisions on setting priorities for floodplain acquisition. Selection criteria included the following:

• Was the property needed for a flood project, per master plans?
• Was the structure a single-family home? Did people sleep there?
• Was the property within a FEMA or city floodway?
• Was flood depth greater than 4 feet above the first floor?
• Was velocity greater than 4-6 feet per second?
• Was depth times velocity greater than 6?
• Was there a concealed hazard, poor access or egress, isolation, or other site consideration that created particular danger?
• Was it adjacent to an existing/proposed improvement or conveyance?
• Was the property needed for some other public use?
• Did the owner have flood insurance that could be applied toward relocation or 1362 eligibility?
• Had the house flooded repeatedly?
• Was the owner willing to sell?
• What was the effect on other properties, upstream or downstream?
• Was the property part of a contiguous-parcel acquisition area?
• Was it part of a coherent area reuse plan?
• Would it experience residual flooding, even when all planned flood control projects were complete?
• What was the property cost, in relation to available funds?
• Was the area or property contaminated by toxics?

[Preface] [Overview] [History] [Buyout or Bailout?] [Garden City & Beyond] [Conclusion] [References] [Appendix]